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1Endogenous Public Policy and Long-Run
Growth
Abstract
We study the determinants of voting outcomes on the provision of public consumption
through marginal income taxes in the context of the simple linear growth model. We focus on
how the dynamic politicoeconomic equilibrium maps the economic fundamentals to policies
a n dl o n g - r u ng r o w t h .W eﬁ n dt h a ti nad e t e r m i n i stic growth environment voters internal-
ize, although imperfectly, the deadweight losses of taxation and vote for lower taxes when
the productivity of capital is higher. Therefore, the politicoeconomic channel reinforces the
positive role of productivity for growth. In a stochastic environment, we ﬁnd that if business
cycles are driven by productivity shocks in the endogenous growth framework, equilibrium
policies imply that taxes should fall in high growth periods and rise in low-growth peri-
ods. In line with existing evidence, our model predicts procyclical public consumption and
countercyclical public consumption GDP shares.
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21. Introduction
The link between public policy and growth has attracted a great deal of attention not only
by economists and policy makers, but is also a matter of debate in newspapers and every-day
discussions. On the one hand, the opportunity to achieve a high level of long-run growth
rests on the ability of the economy to implement an optimal investment strategy. This,
in turn, depends on an incentive structure that allows the microeconomic units to exploit
the available technological possibilities. On the other hand, ﬁscal policies, such as marginal
income taxes, directly reduce the incentives for economic agents to follow optimal investment
strategies. With marginal income taxes, markets are unable to yield the investment return
that reﬂects the technological potential of the economy, since capital markets are distorted.
If one views ﬁscal policies implemented by governments as exogenous, unrelated to the
economic structure, there is a direct negative causality from marginal income taxes to growth.
Several papers examine the growth and welfare eﬀects of such exogenous policy streams using
calibrated or simulated models.1 On the other hand, empirical studies, using regression
analyses, are unable to conﬁrm the causality implied by the theory that treats policies
as exogenous. Many conclusions from such empirical studies are conﬂicting. For example,
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), and Mendoza et. al. (1997), have not given compelling evidence
of a strong negative link between marginal income taxes and growth, at least across large
samples of countries. On the other hand, Hall and Jones (1999) conclude that diﬀerences in
institutions and government policies are behind the large cross-country diﬀerences in growth
rates, productivity and per capita income. Moreover, Fölster and Henrekson (2001), whose
study focuses on rich countries, exploit within-country variation over time, as opposed to
cross-country variation, and report a negative link between government spending and growth.
1 See, for example, Lucas (1990), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), Mendoza et. al. (1997), Ortigueira (1998),
Kneller et. al. (1999), and Rivas (2003).
1By endogenizing government policies, linking them to the economic fundamentals, one
can shed new light on the link between policies and growth. For example, the empirical
conclusion of a weak link between marginal taxes and growth may be that taxes partly ﬁnance
productive capital infrastructure and economic agents allow for higher taxes whenever they
can observe such an opportunity to increase the return to private investment through more
provision of infrastructure.2 But, since in most countries the highest share of the government
budget is spent on non-productive public consumption, the provision of public consumption
is the key issue to explore.
In this paper, we provide a theory of public consumption goods provision in the sim-
plest endogenous growth environment, the “linear growth” model without externalities in
production. This class of linear growth models was proposed by Rebelo (1991) in order to
study the link between exogenous policies, investment and growth in the long run. Without
externalities in production, marginal taxation reduces the returns to accumulable capital.
This reduction in the after-tax return on capital makes households act as if the available
technological possibilities were shrunk in proportion to the level of the marginal tax rate.
Thus, marginal taxes in the framework without externalities in production, always carry the
competitive economy away from both production eﬃciency and Pareto eﬃciency.3
In our model, a public consumption good enters the utility function of households. Each
household operates both as economic agent and voter. The public good can be ﬁnanced
only through marginal income taxes and under balanced ﬁscal budgets. The public good
externality generates a political demand for positive taxes that ﬁnance the provision of the
2 We examine the link between economic fundamentals and the provision of public infrastructure in Koulo-
vatianos and Mirman (2004).
3 On the contrary, in a linear growth model with externalities in production, as this of Romer (1986), the
production possibility frontier is not pre-determined, but it depends on private investment choices. A ﬁscal
policy transfering resources from consumption to investment may lead to both higher production eﬃciency
and to a Paretoimprovement.
2public good. Hence, the occurence of a deadweight loss is inevitable, as marginal taxes gen-
erate disincentives for investment. But voters have the ability, depending on their economic
fundamentals, to partly internalize the deadweight losses of taxation. Thus, we examine how
the dynamic politicoeconomic equilibrium maps the economic fundamentals to policies and
long-run growth.
We ﬁrst study a deterministic growth environment. We ﬁnd that in economies in which
the productivity of capital is higher, voters choose lower taxes, because they (optimally)
select a lower ratio of current public goods to future private consumption. This happens
because, in equilibrium, marginal income taxes create a strong substitution eﬀect, driven
b yt h ef a c tt h a ti ti sn o tt h es t o c ko fc a p i t a lt h a ti st a x e do v e rt i m e ,b u to n l yt h ec a p i t a l
income ﬂow. Because of this voting behavior, the politicoeconomic channel reinforces the
positive role of productivity for growth. Higher productivity gives the opportunity to voters
to choose optimally lower taxes and achieve higher growth.
Our ﬁndings are in accordance with the conclusions of Hall and Jones (1999) for the link
between government policies, growth and long-run diﬀerences in cross country per-capita
incomes. Yet, our results do not suggest that reducing marginal income taxes exogenously
leads to necessarily large improvements in the growth performance. It is, after all, insti-
tutions that creat the ability for private markets to compete with the provisions of public
goods. Democracy and the pure ability of private markets to operate and compete with the
public-goods provision mechanism are the ingredients of our model. Since in our model en-
dogenous policies amplify growth diﬀerences that stem from economic fundamentals, such as
preference and technology parameters, we provide an explanation for the large cross-country
development diﬀerences.
We go further, by examining public policies in a stochastic environment. Interestingly,
3we ﬁnd that if business cycles are driven by productivity shocks in the endogenous growth
framework, equilibrium policies imply that taxes should fall in high growth periods and
rise in low-growth periods. Exploiting growth opportunities further by decreasing taxes in
periods of booms goes against the usual idea of stabilizing countercyclical policies. Moreover,
the public consumption share of GDP is countercyclical in our model, also in accordance
with evidence for OECD countries (only for the public consumption component of the ﬁscal
budget as a share of GDP) reported by Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2002).
At the same time, we ﬁnd that the level of public consumption is procyclical. Several
empirical studies ﬁnd evidence for procyclical public expenditures in general, in Latin Amer-
ican countries (see, for example, Gavin et. al. (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Stein et.
al. (1999)), and also in other economies, including many OECD countries (see Talvi and
Vegh (2000) and Lane (2003)).
We stress, however, that our study is not a public ﬁnance exercise. The policy problem
posed is not the choice of public ﬁnance instruments over time for an exogenously given
stream of public goods. The problem we study is the voters’ choice of the public goods
level over time, given that the policy instrument is a marginal income tax satisfying a
balanced ﬁscal budget. An interesting ﬁnding of Lane (2003) is that countries with more
dispersed political power (a proxy for strong democratic institutions), are more likely to
exhibit procyclical ﬁscal policies. This is in accordance with our model, which expresses a
strong democratic represantation of voters’ political preferences in policy making.
Related studies focusing, as we do, on time-consistent policies and introducing an ex-
ternality in the form of a public consumption good, also appearing in additively-separable
utility functions, are Xie (1997) and Karp and Ho Lee (2003). Xie (1997) discusses the tech-
nical issue of when optimal policies with commitment at time 0 (open-loop policies) may
4be time-consistent. Karp and Ho Lee (2003) examine the public ﬁnance question of setting
optimal marginal taxes for a given exogenous stream of public goods, showing the way of
constructing models exhibiting time-consistent open-loop policies.
In contrast to these studies, we do not discuss the technical issue of time consistency.
Using our framework, we focus on studying the economic background of the interlinkages
between ﬁscal policies and growth, when the one depends upon the other. In our model,
governments are elected, or supported, by voters who are aware of the potential negative
impact of taxes. These voters internalize the deadweight losses of taxation and electoral
process in the most fundamental way, that is, they make perfect-foresight voting decisions.
The concept of perfect foresight voting was ﬁrst proposed by Denzau and Mackay (1981)
and was further articulated by Epple and Kadane (1990) in a spatial model. Simulation-
based studies with perfect-foresight voting models are Krusell et. al. (1997) and Krusell and
Rios-Rull (1999). Moreover, Klein et. al. (2003) suggest a generalized method for simulating
models of time-consistent public-goods provision with perfect foresight.
As all the above literatures are quite specialized and rather technical, our study aims at
pointing out intuitive results and raising null hypotheses. The generality of our conclusions
may be an open question, calling for further theoretical or empirical investigation. Nev-
ertheless, we believe that the observations we make in this paper capture key mechanisms
through which ﬁscal policies depend on the fundamentals of economic environments that
exhibit endogenous sustainable growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the deterministic economy,
its politico-economic equilibrium and the link between economic fundamentals and growth
paths of economies with endogenous policies. In section 3 we extend our model to having
stochastic productivity and we comment on the cyclical behavior of taxes.
52. The Deterministic Economy
The benchmark of our analysis is a deterministic economic environment in which a repro-
ducible and partially storable capital good is accumulated. This capital good may be a
composite of various types of physical and/or human capital. For the purpose of tractabil-
ity, we focus on the dynamics of this single capital variable.
Time is discrete and the time horizon is inﬁnite, t =0 ,1,.... Households comprise a set
I and may diﬀer only with respect to their initial endowment of capital claims (assets). We
denote assets for household i ∈Iat time 0 as ai,0.4 At any point in time, the aggregate




ai,tµt (i)di , t =0 ,1,... (1)
where µt (i) is the measure of individuals of type i at time t. We denote all aggregate variables
by bold characters in order to distinguish themfromvariables pertaining to individual agents.
We also assume that k0 > 0. All households are inﬁnitely-lived. There is a single private
consumable good produced through a linear aggregate production function,
yt = Akt ,( 2 )
with A>0. The marginal return to capital is,
Rt = A and rt = A − δ ,( 3 )
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, and rt is the interest rate, which is constant over
time.
A government, elected by the households each period, collects taxes in order to provide a
single composite public good (parks, hospitals, theaters, art schools, defense, etc.). Nothing
4 The set of households can be countable, ﬁnite, or a continuum. It can also be that all households have
the same initial endowment (representative-agent economy), but in all cases there is a “large” number of
households, making each of them having negligible impact on the aggregate economy.
6is returned to the individuals in the form of a direct monetary transfer. The constitution
allows only one type of taxation, the use of a common ﬂat marginal tax on personal income,
denoted by τt every period. Moreover, the ﬁscal budget should be balanced every period, so
the government revenues (and expenditures) are given by,
gt = τt (A − δ)kt ,( 4 )
i.e., capital depreciation is tax-exempt. In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume
log preferences. In particular, the momentary utility function for all households is,
u(ct,gt)=χln(ct)+( 1− χ)ln(gt) ,( 5 )
with χ ∈ (0,1].5 The assumption of additive separability and homotheticity of preferences
over private and public consumption is not extreme. Amano and Wirjanto (1998) estimate
a utility function of the average American household from aggregate data with constant
intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity of substitution. Their regressions are based on
Euler equations that stem from a permanent-income model with lump-sum taxes.6 They ﬁnd
that private and public consumption are unrelated in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense (they are
neither substitutes nor complements). They also ﬁnd that the elasticities of intertemporal
and intratemporal substitution are both about 1.56. The latter means that the assumption of
natural-log preferences (unitary elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution)
is not an extreme deviation from their ﬁndings.
5 Superscripts i are dropped throughout the text unless necessary.
6 Even though the permanent-income Euler equations of Amano and Wirjanto (1998) diﬀer from the politico-
economic equilibrium conditions of this setup, their ﬁndings should uncover similar estimates for the intra-
and inter-temporal elasticities of substitution with these implied by a model distorted by marginal taxes.
72.1 Competitive equilibrium under any stream of political out-
comes
We assume, for the moment, that a stream of taxes and aggregate capital, {(τt,kt)}
∞
t=0,i s
pre-determined exogenously. Chatterjee (1994) proves that, for a general class of neoclassical
growth setups, households need to know only the future stream of aggregate capital levels
and not the future distributions of physical capital claims in order to calculate their optimal
path of savings accurately.7 The argument of Chatterjee (1994) is valid for the linear-growth
model that we examine. Although it is not necessary that there be a representative agent
in our framework (the case where all households also possess the same initial wealth), due
to the fact that preferences are of the “Gorman form,” enabling linear demand aggregation,
our setup leads to the presence of a representative consumer.8



















7 Using Chatterjee’s (1994) argument, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) prove the same result in an economy
with proportional taxation and lump-sum transfers. Interestingly, Krusell and Smith (1997) ﬁnd that in
neoclassical models modiﬁed in ways such that Chatterjee’s (1994) theoretical argument fails, at a numerical
level, households calculating distribution moments that capture future individual asset distributions, can
very well approximate their optimal path by relying only on the future stream of ﬁrst moments, namely on
the future sequence of aggregate capital. Similar results to Chatterjee (1994) are pointed out by Caselli and
Ventura (2000) in more general continuous-time frameworks.
8 A representative consumer is a ﬁctitious consumer whose demand functions coincide with the corresponding
aggregate demand functions. Thus, Chatterjee (1994) proves the prevalence of the representative consumer
for dynamic decision rules and aggregate laws of motion in a large class of optimal growth economies.
8Here β ∈ (0,1) and the interest rate is given by (3). In equilibrium, {kt}
∞
t=0 should con-
form to every household’s solution to the same problem and to market-clearing conditions.
Individuals have negligible economic weight and they assume that their personal decisions
do not have any impact on aggregate variables and prices. For this reason, the optimality
conditions of a household i are given by,
ct+1
ct
= β [1 + (A − δ)(1− τt+1)] ,( 7 )






=0 . We obtain a closed-
form solution for this problem, given by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The competitive equilibrium decision rules for the Household Problem of
any individual household i, are given by,
at+1 = β [1 + (A − δ)(1− τt)]at , (8)
and,
ct =( 1− β)[1+(A − δ)(1− τt)]at . (9)
The aggregate-economy law of motion for capital is,
kt+1 = β [1 + (A − δ)(1− τt)]kt . (10)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The asset holdings of all households grow at the same rate in equilibrium. Thus, as it
is the case for the class of models with homothetic preferences in Chatterjee (1994), the
relative household wealth distribution is invariant over time.
We stress the particular nature of the competitive equilibrium of this version of the linear
(“AK”) growth model with log-preferences. In the linear growth model with a non-unitary
elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption, any change in future policy plans
invokes a change in the current decisions of households. For example, two future policy










, with n ≥ 0 and  τt+n+1  = τt+n+1,
9lead to diﬀerent household policies at time t, i.e.  at+1  = at+1 and  ct  = ct, if the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is not unitary. In our model, the case of unitary elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, equations (8) and (9) imply that this is not the case, i.e.
consumption policies at time t are exactly the same for diﬀerent continuations of policy
streams.
We emphasize that it is neither that households are not forward-looking, nor that one
cannot study the impact of anticipated policy changes through this version of the model.
Households take account of future changes in policy, but they choose to make the same deci-
sions, as if the future policy change was not there, until they reach the period of occurrence
of the change. When the economy reaches the period in which policies diﬀer, the decision
rules change, and so does the path that the economy follows. The value function of two
identical economies facing, ceteris paribus, diﬀerent policy plans, is therefore diﬀerent since
period 0. Despite the diﬀerent value functions since period 0, the decision rules, up to the
occurrence of the policy change, are the same in the two economies, because households
do not gain extra utility from “consumption smoothing” if their elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is unitary and production technology is linear.
In our model, the inﬂuence of the continuation of a tax plan, {τs}
∞
s=t+1, on decision
rules is not discarded. The inﬂuence of future taxes is “ﬁxed” into invariant parameters of
the decision rules, and they are independent from the future tax plan as well as the levels
of the state variables. These invariant parameters of the decision rules contain non-trivial
information about the responsiveness of households to anticipated future policies. In other
words, the eﬀects of future taxes are expressed in terms of eﬀects of the current tax rate, the
parameters reﬂect how these eﬀects are “enfolded” and redirected back to the current tax.
Because of its simplicity, our model is a good vehicle for studying the most impor-
10tant determinants of forward-looking voting behavior. As we show, our model eliminates
complexities related to strategic interactions among voters for solving for politicoeconomic
Markov-perfect equilibrium.
2.2 Politicoeconomic equilibrium
Since the constitution restricts governments to having a balanced budget, the only voting
issue each period is the current level of the income tax rate. Majority voting over taxes
takes place at the beginning of every period, i.e. before households and producers make
their economic decisions.
Households vote simultaneously, before they act, again simultaneously, in the markets
in order to make their economic decisions given the current period’s electoral outcome. So,
while each household decides, independently, about its best voting strategy, it takes account
of the full impact of its voting action on the current electoral outcome and how this electoral
outcome will aﬀect its own current and future economic decisions, its own future voting
decisions, and the current and future economic and voting decisions of other households in
politicoeconomic equilibrium over the inﬁnite horizon.
The timing of actions mimics the fact that, in most presidential and parliamentary democ-
racies, in the beginning of each period, a government pre-announces a certain ﬁscal budget
and it precommits to it. This ﬁts the speciﬁcation of Cohen and Michel (1988), about the
time-consistent making of ﬁscal policies.9 Our politico-economic equilibrium concept can be
linked observationally to the real world in two ways. Either, (i) elections are held every four
years (so, the duration of one period in our model is four years) and elected governments
commit to their pre-announced policies for four years, or, (ii) independently from whether
9 In particular, Cohen and Michel (1988), in the context of their continuous-time framework, call this
equilibrium concept “feedback Stackelberg equilibrium with instantaneous precommitment.”
11there are elections or not, common voter preferences are reﬂected into the pre-announced
ﬁ s c a lb u d g e ti nt h eb e g i n n i n go fe a c hﬁ s c a ly e a r .
The solutions given by equations (8), (9) and (10) enable us to calculate the analytical





















,( 1 1 )
where κD is a constant.10 T h eo p t i m a lt a xr a t eo fah o u s e h o l da tt i m et is derived from
setting the partial derivative of the value function with respect to τt equal to zero, yielding,
τt = τ
D =
(1 − β)(1− χ)






, t =0 ,1,....( 1 2 )
Note that all households agree upon τD at all times.11 Unanimity across households comes
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h et e r m
ln(ai,t)
1−β in the value function of household i and the current and
future policies {τs}
∞
s=t are additively separable. This feature also leads to the conclusion that
the tax rate, τD, given by (12), coincides with the solution of a benevolent social planner
who chooses period-by-period second-best policies, given that the constitution is restricted
to the use of marginal taxes and a balanced ﬁscal budget in each period. The social planner’s





s=t)ω(i)µt (i)di, for any set of
weights ω(i) ≥ 0 on household i’s utility. Equation (11) implies that τD is the second-best












11The symbol “τD” represents the winning tax rate in the deterministic economy.
122.3 Economic fundamentals, public policy and long-run growth
Since the equilibrium tax rate in the deterministic political economy is constant, the equi-
librium growth rate is also constant.12 In particular, from equation (8), after substituting
the tax rate (12), the growth rate of all economic variables in this economy is,
γ
D =
β (1 + A − δ)
1+( 1− β)(1− χ)
− 1 .( 1 3 )
The endogenous tax rate given by equation (12) has many intuitive features. If the relative
weight of utility derived from the consumption of public goods is higher (lower χ), then
τD is higher, and therefore growth is lower. More patient households (higher β)c h o o s ea
lower ratio of current public goods to future private consumption (by choosing a lower τD),
because they can compensate for relatively less public goods today, by achieving a higher
growth rate. In the case of higher β, this happens because households are fundamentally
more willing to save. A higher capital depreciation rate, δ, leads to a lower interest rate and
less incentive to save, so voters choose a higher τD in order to derive more utility from a
higher public-to-private goods ratio, leading to lower growth.
One of the most important economic fundamentals for explaining cross-country diﬀer-
ences in living standards and growth rates is cross-country productivity diﬀerences. Hall
and Jones (1999) stress that physical and human capital accumulation alone are inadequate
to explain the biggest part of cross-country diﬀerences in per-capita income. They ﬁnd that
large productivity diﬀerences across countries explain most of cross-country diﬀerences in
development.
In the context of our endogenous growth model, if we treat capital as a composite good,
consisting of physical and human capital, diﬀerences in the productivity parameter, A,a r e
12So, since period 0 the political economy is in a steady state, there are no transitional dynamics leading to
it.
13crucial for growth because they also inﬂuence the level of marginal taxes. This can be seen
by equation (12). When A is higher, voters internalize the growth opportunities generated
by a higher capital productivity, and vote for a lower τD.
For example, consider a world of economies in which policies are exogenous. Suppose
that the marginal tax rate in this world is constant over time, and let us denote it as τexog.
A rise in the productivity parameter, A, causes growth, γexog, to increase by the gradient,
∂γexog
∂A
= β (1 − τ
exog) ,( 1 4 )
as it can be veriﬁed by equation (8). The gradient given by (14) determines the link between
cross-country productivity diﬀerences and cross-country growth diﬀerences. Now, consider
a world of political economies, where policies are endogenous in each country. A rise in the



















(1 − β)(1− χ)
1+( 1− β)(1− χ)
1
(A − δ)
2 .( 1 5 )
If we pick two countries, one from each of the two diﬀerent ﬁctitious worlds, both charac-
terized by the same productivity level, A, and such that taxes are at the same level, namely







Thus, the politicoeconomic channel generates higher cross-country development diﬀerences
that arise from structural cross-country diﬀerences in productivity.
This result is driven by the negative dependence of taxes on productivity, A. In politi-
coeconomic equilibrium, marginal income taxes create a strong substitution eﬀect, namely,
14voters are willing to substitute current public consumption with more future private con-
sumption. This substitution eﬀect is driven by the fact that it is not the stock of capital
that is taxed over time, but only the capital income ﬂow. The balanced ﬁscal budget ties,
directly, the quantity of public consumption to the taxed capital income ﬂow. But the prices
of future private consumption depend (negatively) also on the whole stock of capital, not
only on its capital income ﬂow. A higher productivity, A, gives better opportunities for
capital accumulation and, in turn, for a sharper decline in the prices of private consumption
over time.
In other words, the tax-driven mechanism of public goods provision is dominated by the
competitive price mechanism of private goods provision. Due to the presence of endogenous
growth in the model, and the critical dependence of growth on productivity, the higher
the productivity, A, the higher the dominance of the competitive price mechanism over the
public-goods provision mechanism. This is why the deadweight loss of taxation is higher
when production possibilities and growth opportunities are higher, and voters perceive this.
Higher productivity gives the opportunity to voters to choose optimally lower taxes and
achieve higher growth.
How sensitive the results of our analysis are to diﬀerent parameter values for the elastic-
ities of intra- and inter-temporal substitution that make economic and voting decision rules
perplexedly responsive to future policy paths, is an open question for quantitative investi-
gation. We conjecture that the most important determinants of the behavior of forward-
looking voters in linear-growth frameworks are captured by this version of the model and
there should not be signiﬁcant diﬀerences in our main qualitative results with a diﬀerent
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Nevertheless, it is useful to use this particular para-
digm as a stimulus for interesting quantitative questions of positive explanations of the size
15of government and tax distortions.
3. The Stochastic Economy
The cyclical movement of ﬁscal policies is an open research topic, both theoretically and
empirically. The traditional Keynesian view suggests that policies should be countercyclical,
namely government spending and taxes should decrease in recessions and increase during
expansions. Barro (1979) suggests tax smoothing over the business cycle, so if the ﬁscal
budget is not restricted to be balanced, the public surplus should be procyclical.
Several empirical studies ﬁnd evidence for procyclical ﬁscal policies. Gavin et. al. (1996),
Gavin and Perotti (1997), Stein et. al. (1999) ﬁnd that both taxes and government expen-
ditures in Latin American countries are procyclical. Talvi and Vegh (2000) and Lane (2003)
report procyclical policies also for rich countries, and also for public consumption, the focus
of this paper. Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2002) study the cyclical behavior of GDP shares
of several components of government spending in OECD countries and test for possible cycli-
cal asymmetries of the ﬁscal budget in periods of expansion, versus periods of contraction.
Although public consumption is procyclical in the OECD (see Lane (2003)), Hercowitz and
Strawczynski (2002) ﬁnd that its GDP share is generally countercyclical over the cycle.
Lane (2003) claims that the ﬁscal cyclicality implications of endogenized public con-
sumption in neoclasssical frameworks rest upon the speciﬁcation of the utility function with
respect to private versus public consumption (see p. 2664). In particular, Lane (2003)
stresses that if public and private goods are separable in utility and also neither substitutes
nor complements (like they are in our model), then endogenous public consumption in a
neoclassical framework should be smooth over the business cycle.13
13Thus, in order to address the empirically observed procyclicality of government components, political
economy models of the “voracity eﬀect” have been suggested by Lane and Tornell (1996) and (1998) and
Tornell and Lane (1998) and (1999).
16In this section, we show that, in a stochastic endogenous growth environment (as opposed
to an exogenous long-run growth neoclassical environment), endogenizing public consump-
tion through perfect-foresight voting reconciliates theory with the empirical observation of
public-consumption procyclicality and the countercyclicality of the public consumption GDP
share. Moreover, we examine the eﬀect of higher capital productivity volatility on average
taxes.
We extend the deterministic model of the previous section to the case in which the capital
productivity is random. The model is the same as in the deterministic case, with the sole
diﬀerence that aggregate production is now given by,
yt = Atkt ,( 1 6 )










where µ>0 and σ ≥ 0. The special case σ =0 , coincides with the model of the previous
section. Parametrizing the distribution of the capital-productivity shock in this way, allows












i.e. if two countries diﬀer only with respect to parameter σ, they have the same average
capital productivity but diﬀerent capital-productivity variances.
173.1 Competitive equilibrium in the stochastic economy
The interest rate in this stochastic model is,
rt = At − δ ,( 1 7 )
and the ﬁscal budget now is,
gt = τt (At − δ)kt .( 1 8 )
The problem of an individual household i, is described by the following constrained
problem,





























In competitive equilibrium, {kt}
∞
t=0 should conform to every household’s solution to the






1+( At+1 − δ)(1− τt+1)
ct+1
 
,( 2 0 )












=0 .I t t u r n s
out that we get the same solution as in the deterministic economy,
at+1 = β [1 + (At − δ)(1− τt)]at ,( 2 1 )
18and,
ct =( 1− β)[1+(At − δ)(1− τt)]at ,( 2 2 )
satisfy both necessary (and suﬃcient) conditions (20) and (19), and the trasversality condi-
tion.
3.2 Politicoeconomic equilibrium in the stochastic economy
As in the deterministic case, the only voting issue each period is the current level of the
income tax rate. In the beginning of each period, the shock At is revealed, then majority
voting over taxes follows, and afterwards households and producers make their economic
decisions, given the electoral outcome. Each household decides, independently, about its best
voting strategy, taking into account the full impact of its voting action on the current electoral
outcome. Moreover, given the probability distribution of future shocks, the household also
considers how the electoral outcome aﬀects its own current and probable future economic
decisions, its own probable future voting decisions, and the current and probable future
economic and voting decisions of others in politicoeconomic equilibrium over the inﬁnite
horizon.
Given the analytical solutions in equations (21) and (22), the form of the value function



























19where κS is a constant.14 Setting the partial derivative of the value function, with respect




(1 − β)(1− χ)






, t =0 ,1,....( 2 4 )
Again, there is unanimity about τS
t , the winning tax rate in the stochastic economy, at all
times. The rationale behind unanimity across voters is the same as the one presented in
the deterministic case. Moreover, following the argument made for the deterministic model,
the tax policy given by (24) is also the second-best policy of a benevolent utilitarian social
planner.
From equation (24) it is clear that taxes are countercyclical. When productivity, At,i s
high (low), households vote in favor of an decrease (increase) of the current-pulic to future-
private consumption ratio, by reducing (increasing) the chosen tax rate.
In the stochastic endogenous growth model, marginal income taxes create, again, a strong
substitution eﬀect between current public and future private consumption. While current
and future consumption is provided by private markets, the public-goods provision mecha-
nism is taxes. Accumulating more capital is the key to better opportunities for having more
of both private and public goods in the future. As it is revealed by the gross eﬀective interest
rate, 1+(At − δ)(1− τt), only income and not the stock of capital is taxed over time. Thus,
it is the substitution eﬀect that leads to choosing lower taxes when productivity is higher.
In other words, the politicoeconomic equilibrium in the stochastic endogenous growth model
implies that growth opportunities are exploited by decreasing taxes in periods of booms (and








2 +( 1− χ)
Et [ln(At+1 − δ)]
1 − β
.
20Substituting equation (24) into (18), yields the politocoeconomic equilibrium value for
public consumption, namely,
gt =
(1 − β)(1− χ)(1+At − δ)
1+( 1− β)(1− χ)
kt ,( 2 5 )
which implies that government consumtion is procyclical in equilibrium. Moreover, combin-
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,( 2 6 )
which means that t h eG D Ps h a r eo fg o v e r n m e n tc o n s u m p t i o ni sc o u n t e r c y c l i c a lin equilib-
rium. Both implications of our model are consistent with the empirical evidence discussed
in the beginning of this section.
3.3 Volatility, average taxes and average growth in the political
economy
Several papers, such as Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion (1999), and
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003), study the link between economic volatility and long-run
growth. They ﬁnd that there is a negative correlation between volatility and average growth.
Since there is not much theoretical background addressing these empirical ﬁndings, we ex-
amine whether volatility has an impact on average taxes and, through the channel of taxes,
we also examine whether average growth is aﬀected.15
Recall that the distribution of the productivity shock, At,i sm o d e l e ds ot h a tac h a n g e
in parameter σ has no eﬀect on the average shock, E (At), whereas volatility, Va r(At),
does change. Does a diﬀerent structural volatility, σ, of the productivity shock At,c h a n g e
15Aizenman and Marion (1999), apart from reporting a statistically signiﬁcant negative link between inno-
vation volatility and private investment GDP shares in developing countries, they suggest some theoretical
explanations for their ﬁndings. Their explanations rely upon risk aversion and non-linear budget constraints.
21average taxes and average growth in politicoeconomic equilibrium? We show the dependence
of average taxes on volatility in the proposition that follows.
Proposition 2 If the volatility of capital productivity is higher, then the average tax rate is
higher.
Proof. From equation (24),
E (τt)=
(1 − β)(1− χ)







.( 2 7 )





on parameter σ.S i n c eAt is lognormal, (At − δ) is also
lognormal. Let parameters ˆ µ and ˆ σ be deﬁned as,
ln(At − δ) ∼ N
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whereas,
e













.( 2 9 )
22Thus,
−ln(At − δ) ∼ N
 





































proving the proposition. 
Proposition 2 shows that cross-country diﬀerences in the volatility of capital productivity
are linked to diﬀerences in average taxes. However, in politicoeconomic equilibrium, there
is no link between volatility and average growth. Combining (21) and (24), we see that the




β (1 + At − δ)
1+( 1− β)(1− χ)












1+( 1− β)(1− χ)
=0.( 3 1 )
The result expressed by equation (31) comes from the fact that in equilibrium, after
combining (25) with (22), the ratio
gt




23The ﬂuctuation over the cycle is between savings and the two types of consumption in
equilibrium. For this reason, the volatility of At does not aﬀect average private and public
consumption, or their average share. Moreover, the fact that the volatility of At does aﬀect
average taxes comes from the fact that capital depreciation is tax-exempt.
The empirical studies such as Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion (1999),
and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003) assert that after controling for several country-speciﬁc











should be negatively correlated. Our speciﬁcation of the sto-
chastic structure of productivity, At, mimics this claim in the regression speciﬁcation of the
above empirical studies.











, at least through the channel of taxation for the provision of public consumption.
An open question is whether assuming diﬀerent intratemporal and intertemporal elastici-
ties of substitution between private and public consumption would lead to a link between
volatility and growth through the politico-economic channel. Yet, another open question
is whether cross country regression analysis can control for the cross-country variation in











comes from cross-country variations in average productivity,
E (At), or, in the language of our model, from cross-country variations in parameter µ.I n
the last case, our model’s implication about the absence of a link between volatility and
growth is not necessarily erroneous.
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27Appendix




ct , t =0 ,1,...,( A 1 )
where λt is the shadow price of the ﬁnal good with λ0 =1(the numeraire) and:
λt−1
λt
=1+( 1− τt)(A − δ) , t =0 ,1,...,( A 2 )
with λ−1 =1+( 1 − τ0)(A − δ), by default. The household budget constraint combined
with (A2) becomes,
ct + at+1 =
λt−1
λt
at or λtct = λt−1at − λtat+1 .( A 3 )
Considering equation (A3) one period ahead, using (A1), and deﬁning,
zt ≡ λt−1at , t =0 ,1,...,
yields,
zt+2 − (1 + β)zt+1 + βzt =0.( A 4 )
Equation (A4) is an elementary second-order linear diﬀerence equation with two obvious
solutions, zt+1 = βzt and zt+1 = zt. The second solution is ruled out since it implies that
λtat+1 = λt−1at, so from equation (A3), it must be ct =0in all periods, which cannot
be optimal. Alternatively, zt+1 = zt implies that λtat+1 = λ−1a0,o r
λtat+1
λ−1 = a0,s of r o m














a violation of the transversality condition. Therefore, only the ﬁrst solution is applicable,
at+1 = β
λt−1
λt at, and using equation (A2), equation (8) is proved. Equation (9) comes from
combining (8) and the household budget constraint. Equation (10) comes from (8) through
linear aggregation. Note that (A4) would not be linear if preferences were not “log.” 
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